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Falling Through the Cracks: Missouri
Amends Its Felon Firearm Possession Statute
Missouri Revised Statute § 5 71.0 70
I. INTRODUCTION
In early September 2007, police in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, arrested a
previously convicted felon whom they discovered drivinp with a loaded gun,
a magazine of ammunition, and a stun gun in his vehicle. The man, who was
convicted in Illinois in 2000 for sexual abuse and failing to register as a sex
offender, was later released after police determined that his possession of the
gun, ammunition, and the stun gun did not violate Missouri law.2 This
incident inspired Cape Girardeau County Prosecuting Attorney H. Morley
Swingle to lobby for changes to Missouri's statute prohibiting some felons
from possessing firearms.
3
Influential state legislators, including the president pro tem of the senate,
immediately expressed support for Swingle's proposed revisions to the law.4
On June 26, 2008, Governor Matt Blunt signed Missouri House Bill 2034 into
law which, among other things, made it easier for a person previously
convicted of a felony to be arrested and prosecuted for possessing a firearm.
5
The changes made by the 2008 Missouri Legislature to the state's felon-
in-possession law were mostly improvements. While the changes were
intended to enact "better protections . . . to prevent dangerous felons from
falling through the cracks when it comes to firearm possession,' 6 it is not
clear that the drafters of the new statute considered all of the potential
consequences arising from the changes. While some of the consequences are
1. Bridget DiCosmo, State Law Lets Felon with Gun Go Free, SE. MISSOURIAN,
Sept. 6, 2007, at IA.
2. Id. The lapse of time between his conviction and this incident allowed him
to possess a firearm without violating Missouri law, as will be discussed, infra.
3. Letter from H. Morley Swingle, Prosecuting Attorney, Cape Girardeau
County, to Michael Gibbons, President Pro Tem, Mo. Senate and Rod Jetton,
Speaker, Mo. House of Representatives (Sept. 6, 2007) (on file with author). Mr.
Swingle lobbied for similar legislation in 2001, but the legislation did not pass. Letter
from H. Morley Swingle, Prosecuting Attorney, Cape Girardeau County, to Jeremiah
W. Nixon, Attorney General, State of Mo. (July 26, 2001) (on file with author).
4. Letter from Michael R. Gibbons, President Pro Tem, Mo. Senate, to H.
Morley Swingle, Prosecuting Attorney, Cape Girardeau County (Sept. 20, 2007) (on
file with author); Letter from Jason G. Crowell, Senator, Mo. Senate, to H. Morley
Swingle, Prosecuting Attorney, Cape Girardeau County (Nov. 29, 2007) (on file with
author).
5. H.R. 2034, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
6. Letter from Michael R. Gibbons to H. Morley Swingle, supra note 4.
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positive and will resolve the legitimate concerns expressed by prosecutors7
and the media,8 a number of unintended outcomes may arise from the new
formulation of the statute as well. This Note argues that the state legislature
should have enacted a statute following the contours of the federal statute in
pursuit of a consistent, simple approach to regulating felons' possession of
firearms. This Note also reviews the general background of laws prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms, considers the constitutional implications of
those laws, and critically examines the recent changes to the Missouri felon-
in-possession statute.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The federal government and many states have enacted legislation that
prohibits, to some extent, a felon from lawfully possessing a firearm. State
and federal laws vary widely, each with its own nuances and exceptions.
A, Federal Approach
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), felons may not "possess ... any firearm or
ammunition; or . . .receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 9  The statute
defines a "firearm" as "any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of
an explosive" as well as the frame of such a weapon, a muffler or silencer, or
a destructive device.' 0  However, it is important to note that "antique
firearms" are expressly excluded from this definition." The "antique
firearm" exception allows persons otherwise prohibited from possessing
firearms to own firearms manufactured during or before 1898, certain
replicas, and muzzleloading guns that cannot fire fixed ammunition.12 Even
modem muzzleloaders that could be purchased in a retail store fall within the
definition of an "antique firearm."'
13
The restrictions present in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) apply to "any person...
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year,"' 4 although certain exceptions narrow this
7. Letter from H. Morley Swingle to Michael Gibbons and Rod Jetton, supra
note 3, at 2; Letter from H. Morley Swingle to Jeremiah W. Nixon, supra note 3, at 2.
8. Editorial, Guns and Felons, SE. MISSOURIAN, Sept. 14, 2007, at 6A.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (2006).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 921(a)(16).
13. See id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Although the phrase "convicted in any court" might
suggest that a conviction in a foreign court could meet the requirement, the Supreme
[Vol. 74
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definition. For example, persons charged with federal or state crimes
"pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or
other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices" are not
included.15 In addition, those convicted of state crimes punishable by a term
of imprisonment of two years or less but considered misdemeanors are also
excluded. 16
The law also allows a person who is disqualified from possessing a
firearm to appeal to the Attorney General for relief from the ban. 17 If an
application is approved by the Attorney General, the appellant is no longer
prohibited from possessing a firearm. '8 If the application is denied, however,
the individual can appeal the denial to the district court.19 Furthermore, only
a denial of relief is appealable, not the government's failure to approve or
deny the application.20 The practical effect of this configuration is to make it
impossible for an individual to appeal the Attorney General's decision to take
no action on an application for relief.
B. Missouri Approach
Prior to 2008, Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070 stated:
1. A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a
concealable firearm if he has any concealable firearm in his
possession and:
(1) He has pled guilty to or has been convicted of a dangerous
felony, as defined in section 556.061, RSMo, or of an attempt
to commit a dangerous felony, or of a crime under the laws of
any state or of the United States which, if committed within
this state, would be a dangerous felony, or confined therefor in
this state or elsewhere during the five-year period immediately
preceding the date of such possession; or
Court has expressly rejected this interpretation. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385,
394 (2005).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A).
16. Id. § 921(a)(20)(B).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2006).
18. Id.
19. Id. While this statute is in full effect, Congress has, without explanation,
expressly forbade the use of appropriations for government agencies to act on these
applications since 1992. See United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 73-75 (2002). Bean
indicates that the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to receive applications;
however the Attorney General was substituted into this role under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
20. Bean, 537 U.S. at 75-76.
2009]
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(2) He is a fugitive from justice, is habitually in an intoxicated
or drugged condition, or is currently adjudged mentally
incompetent.
2. Unlawful possession of a concealable firearm is a class C
felony.21
The law refers to Missouri Revised Statute § 556.061 for its definition of
"dangerous felony," which includes the crimes of:
[A]rson in the first degree, assault in the first degree, attempted
forcible rape if physical injury results, attempted forcible sodomy
if physical injury results, forcible rape, forcible sodomy,
kidnapping, murder in the second degree, assault of a law
enforcement officer in the first degree, domestic assault in the first
degree, elder abuse in the first degree, robbery in the first degree,
statutory rape in the first degree when the victim is a child less than
twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the act giving
rise to the offense, statutory sodomy in the first degree when the
victim is a child less than twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the act giving rise to the offense, and, abuse of a
child pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection 3 of section
568.060, RSMo, [and] child kidnapping.22
C. Other States 'Approaches
States have not taken a uniform approach in regulating felons'
possession of firearms. For example, Connecticut law takes a strict approach,
similar to the revised Missouri statute. The plainly written Connecticut statute
prohibits any person who has been convicted of a felony from possessing any
firearm or stun-gun-type device.23 The law contains no time limitations,
limitations on the nature of the predicate offense, or exceptions for certain
weapons.
24
Georgia's statute is somewhat more narrowly tailored than those in
Missouri and Connecticut. While all felons are forbidden from possessing
firearms under the Georgia law, the nature of their initial crime impacts the
potential punishment for the possession offense.5 Any felon convicted of
unlawfully possessing a firearm is subject to a sentence between one and five
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.070 (2000), amended by Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.070
(Supp. 2008).
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061(8) (Supp. 2008).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217 (West 2007).
24. Id.
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-131 (2007).
[Vol. 74
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26years. If a felon whose predicate offense was one of an enumerated group
of offenses termed a "forcible felony," then the sentence is five years.27
Indiana's law resembles the pre-revision Missouri statute. Under this
statute, those previously convicted of a "serious violent felony" are prohibited
from possessing a firearm. The law also provides for convictions under
state laws which are "substantially similar" to the elements of a "serious
violent felony., 29  While the statute terms the offenses "violent," it also
includes some non-violent drug offenses.
30
D. The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms
The right to possess firearms is, to some degree, protected by both the
United States Constitution 31 and the Missouri Constitution.32 Nevertheless,
cases decided under both the federal and state constitutions have held that
some legislative limits on the classes of persons who are allowed to own or
keep weapons are permissible. The nature and extent of these limitations
remains the key unresolved issue.
26. Id.
27. Id. The law defines forcible felonies to include:
[A]ny felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence
against any person and further includes, without limitation, murder; felony
murder; burglary; robbery; armed robbery; kidnapping; hijacking of an
aircraft or motor vehicle; aggravated stalking; rape; aggravated child
molestation; aggravated sexual battery; arson in the first degree; the
manufacturing, transporting, distribution, or possession of explosives with
intent to kill, injure, or intimidate individuals or destroy a public building;
terroristic threats; or acts of treason or insurrection.
Id. § 16-11-131(e).
28. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-4-5(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). This statute
includes many of the same crimes listed supra note 27, but also includes notable
additions like incest and certain drug offenses. Id. § 35-47-4-5(b).
29. Id. § 35-47-4-5(a)(1)(B).
30. Id. § 35-47-4-5(b)(23)-(27).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (holding that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms).
32. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("That the right of every citizen to keep and bear
arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid
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1. Federal Statute and Caselaw
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the Second
Amendment to allow significant regulation of firearms in the 1939 case of
United States v. Miller. In Miller, the defendant was indicted for possessing
an unregistered double-barrel shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches
in length in violation of federal law.34  The defendant challenged the
indictment on the basis that the statute violated his Second Amendment right
to bear arms.35 The Court disagreed, stating that the Second Amendment
only applies to firearms considered part of "ordinary military equipment" to
"contribute to the common defense. ' '36 Until 2008, Miller was the United
States Supreme Court's only guidance to lower courts regarding the
application of the Second Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court first upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the
federal felon-in-possession statute, as constitutional in Lewis v. United
States.37 In Lewis, George Calvin Lewis, Jr. was indicted and later convicted
for unlawfully receiving and possessing a firearm as a felon.38  Lewis'
predicate offense was a 1961 state court conviction for breaking and
entering.39 The primary point on appeal was whether the predicate felony
conviction could be collaterally attacked in defense of the felon-in-possession
charge.40 The Court ruled against Lewis, finding that the felon-in-possession
law was valid regardless of the fact that the original offense could be
collaterally attacked on constitutional grounds.4' While Lewis' primary
holding is not directly pertinent under a Second Amendment analysis, the
Court addressed the issue of constitutionality in dicta, stating that "legislative
restrictions on the use of firearms . . . do [not] trench upon any
constitutionally protected liberties. ''42 The Court went on to cite Miller for
the premise that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to keep and
bear arms unless reasonably related to a well-regulated militia.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same result some eight
years earlier in Cody v. United States.44 In Cody, James Cody was convicted
of making false statements to a fireanns dealer in violation of federal law.45
33. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
34. Id. at 175.
35. Id. at 176.
36. Id. at 178.
37. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
38. Id. at 57.
39. Id. at 56-57.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Id. at 65.
42. Id. at 65 n.8.
43. Id.
44. 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972).
45. Id. at 35.
[Vol. 74
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The government alleged that Cody falsely certified that he had not been
convicted of a felony. 46 The court, applying the Miller holding, held that
regulations on civilian possession of firearms are permissible because the
constitutional right to bear arms only protects the possession or use of
firearms in the context of a well-regulated militia.47 Although Cody
considered the constitutionality of the federal statute that forbade making
48false statements to a federal firearms dealer, the analysis also applies to the
federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing weapons because both
statutes arguably restrict the exercise of Second Amendment rights.
Prior to 2008, lower federal courts routinely read Miller to stand for the
proposition that the Second Amendment only applied to bearing arms in
connection with service in the militia.49 This interpretation Eprevailed until the
Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. In Heller, Dick
Anthony Heller challenged the District of Columbia's denial of a registration
certificate that would allow him to keep a handgun in his home.51 The Court
carefully noted that it did not view the Second Amendment as an unlimited
right,52 but held that the Second Amendment prohibits the federal government
from enacting an outright ban on the possession of firearms.
53
The Court's decision in Heller presents an interesting conflict. Courts
issuing decisions like those in Lewis and Cody relied on the belief that Miller
rejected an interpretation of the Second Amendment protecting an individual
right to bear arms.54 But, the Heller court takes a different view of Miller,
stating that the latter only addresses the fact that "the type of weapon at issue
was not eligible for Second Amendment protection." 55  This statement
undermines the basic reasoning employed in Lewis and Cody because both
cases look to Miller for Congress' authority to regulate who can possess a
firearm - far beyond the power to simply determine which types of firearms
are eligible for constitutional protection.
The majority in Heller makes an effort, albeit in dicta, to avoid
undermining the legal authority for banning felons from possessing firearms.
"Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the
full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
46. Id. at 35-36.
47. Id. at 36-37 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
48. Id. at 35.
49. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
50. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
51. Id. at 2788.
52. Id. at 2816. The Court also stated that the historical tradition of banning
"dangerous and unusual weapons" remains in force. Id. at 2817.
53. Id. at 2821-22.
54. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
55. 128 S. Ct. at 2814 (emphasis omitted).
2009]
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felons ... ."56 This brief passage offers no reasoning or authority for the
statement, a fact which is pointed out by Justice Stephen Breyer's dissenting
opinion.
57
Because Heller was decided on the law of the District of Columbia, a
federal enclave,58 instead of the law of a state, the facts of the case did not
present the Court with an opportunity to decide whether the Second
Amendment should operate against the states. Although the Second
Amendment, as interpreted by Heller, only restrains the federal government,
the Missouri Constitution may serve to limit the state felon-in-possession
statute.
2. Missouri's Statute and Caselaw
Missouri courts have never addressed the question of whether the pre-
2008 version of Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070 ran afoul of article I,
section 23 of the Missouri Constitution. This constitutional section provides
"the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home,
person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power,
shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed
weapons. 59 Missouri appellate courts have, however, had the occasion to
review the constitutionality of other gun control regulation.
For example, in City of Cape Girardeau v. Joyce, the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Eastern District considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance
that prohibited individuals from openly carrying a deadly weapon. 60 William
Joyce was charged with violating the ordinance when he was found riding a
motorcycle with a loaded pistol plainly visible in a holster.61 He challenged
his conviction on the grounds that it violated article I, section 23 of the
Missouri Constitution. In rejecting Joyce's argument that the Missouri
Constitution granted him a right to bear arms unfettered by state legislation
and affirming his conviction,63  the court based its decision on State v.
Wilforth.64  Wilforth held that the Missouri Constitution permitted the
legislature to regulate the bearing of arms.65  There, the defendant was
convicted and fined $10 for carrying a firearm into a church where a school
art show was being held.66 He appealed his conviction on constitutional
56. Id. at 2816-17.
57. Id. at 2869-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
59. MO. CONST. art. I, § 23.




64. Id. (citing State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881)).
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grounds, but the court rebuffed his challenge, stating that "the constitution...
has neither expressly nor by implication denied to the legislature the right to
enact laws in regard to the manner in which arms shall be borne."67 In its last
paragraph, the Joyce opinion offered a vague limit as to how the legislature
could regulate firearms, stating that, "[n]othing in the Missouri constitution
limits the power of the legislature to enact laws pertaining to the time, place
and manner of carrying weapons."
68
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Following the incident described in the introduction, where a convicted
felon was found by Cape Girardeau police to be in possession of a firearm,
yet not in violation of Missouri law, commentators expressed three primary
criticisms of Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070.69 First, requiring that the
predicate offense be a dangerous felony arguably excludes too many offenses
that should be included, like sexual assault and robbery.70 Second, "the law
only applies to conceal[able] weapons." 71 Finally, the law only applies to
those felons who were convicted or released from prison in the last five
years.
7 2
During the 2007 legislative session, in response to criticisms of the
existing statute, State Representative Brian Munzlinger introduced House Bill
2034, which modified Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070 to conform to the
requests of Mr. Swingle and the Southeast Missourian.73 The bill, in the form
ultimately adopted by the General Assembly and signed into law by the
governor, provides that:
67. Id. (quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840)).
68. Joyce, 884 S.W.2d at 35.
69. Editorial, supra note 8, at 6A. The editorial asks the legislature to "tighten
the law in an effort to keep guns out of the hands of convicted felons." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. A "concealable firearm" is defined as "any firearm with a barrel less than
sixteen inches in length, measured from the face of the bolt or standing breech." Mo.
REv. STAT. § 571.010 (Supp. 2008). A firearm is defined as "any weapon that is
designed or adapted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive." Id.
72. Editorial, supra note 8, at 6A. It has been argued that this interpretation of
the law's time limitation is incorrect, and that, instead, any person who has been
convicted of or pled guilty to a dangerous felony under Missouri law, federal law, or
the laws of another state is permanently barred from possessing a firearm, but those
who are convicted of other crimes are prohibited from possessing firearms for five
years following their release from incarceration. State v. Jackson, 948 S.W.2d 138,
139-40 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997). This interpretation has been generally rejected by
commentators. See Robert H. Dierker, Possession of Weapons by Certain Persons, in
32 MISSOURI PRACTICE § 41.8 (2d ed. 2004); Letter from H. Morley Swingle to
Michael Gibbons and Rod Jetton, supra note 3, at 2.
73. H.R. 2034, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
2009]
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A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if
such person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession
and:
(1) Such person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of
this state, or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the United
States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony; or
(2) Such person is a fugitive from justice, is habitually in an
intoxicated or drugged condition, or is currently adjudged mentally
incompetent.74
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Reasons for a Felon Firearm Possession Ban
After release from prison, felons are typically subjected to a number of
collateral sanctions in addition to being prohibited from possessing firearms.
In many states, felons are prohibited from serving on juries, voting, or being
elected to public office." The justification for prohibitin7 felons from jury
service is frequently explained as the "probity of the jury." This rests on the
idea that felons possess "poor character [and] innate untrustworthiness," 77
which, as a result, leads some commentators to argue that their presumptively
bad character could harm proper decision making or inject an inherent bias
against the criminal justice system into the jury room.i 8 Laws prohibiting
felons from voting are often justified because felons may be more likely to
engage in voter fraud or use their vote to enact undesirable changes in
society. 79 Some fear that felons "would 'band together' to loosen criminal
laws, [or] elect weak-on-crime sheriffs. 's Similar concerns are expressed as
reasons to disqualify felons for running for public office.81
74. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.070 (Supp. 2008).
75. James M. Binnall, EG1900 ... The Number They Gave Me When They
Revoked My Citizenship: Perverse Consequences of Ex-Felon Civic Exile, 44
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 667, 669-70 (2008).
76. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
65, 102 (2003).
77. Id.
78. Binnall, supra note 75, at 675-76 (noting other authors' arguments in support
of banning felons from jury service).
79. Andrea Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner's Campaign: Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right to Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REv.
801, 821; KATHERINE IRENE PETrUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA:
HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND MODERN CONSEQUENCES 140
(2005).
80. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 13 (2006).
81. Steinacker, supra note 79, at 823.
[Vol. 74
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Remarkably, there is virtually no literature offering justifications for
prohibiting violent and non-violent felons alike from possessing firearms.
8 2
Common sense indicates that it is good public policy to prohibit those
convicted of violent felonies from possessing firearms in order to prevent
them from using a gun to perpetrate additional violence. This rationale,
however, does little to explain why a non-violent felon is barred from
possessing a firearm. As a result, it is necessary to extrapolate a justification
for the bans from literature explaining the justifications for other collateral
consequences. Each of these justifications for excluding felons from
participating in civic activities is related to a perception of the felon as
untrustworthy with an important privilege. 83 The disqualifications appear to
be aimed at protecting the public from some harm caused by a person who
has been convicted of a felony. It therefore follows that the reasoning for
prohibiting all felons from possessing firearms could be theoretically similar:
just as felons are prohibited from voting because of the harm they might do
through voter fraud or through enacting improper initiatives, felons are
prohibited from possessing firearms because of the perceived risks of putting
a deadly apparatus in the hands of one who has shown serious disrespect for
the law by their commission of a felony.
B. Policy Grounds
The most laudable aspect of the 2008 revision to Missouri Revised
Statute § 571.070 is the widening of the definition of prohibited firearm from
only concealable firearms to any firearm. 84  This change seems to be
grounded in the belief that any gun is dangerous. Further, if the statute's
primary purpose is public safety, the law should not distinguish between
concealable firearms and those with longer barrels. However, the pre-2008
statutory limitation to concealable weapons was not baseless; in fact, it even
put Missouri in accord with federal statistics on the issue. Studies from the
Department of Justice show that "[o]f all firearm-related crime . . . , 86%
involved handguns." 85  The previous limitation was certainly narrowly
tailored to focus on guns likely to be used in crime, but was also
82. The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that a law prohibiting felons from
possessing firearms was enacted "to keep guns out of the hands of those individuals
who by their prior conduct had demonstrated that they may not possess a firearm
without being a threat to society." Landers v. State, 299 S.E.2d 707, 709-10 (Ga.
1983).
83. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
84. H.R. 2034, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
85. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS,
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under-inclusive to a degree, as the remaining 14% of firearms used in crime
involving guns were not prohibited to felons under the law.
86
On the other hand, the change regarding the concealability requirement
leaves the Missouri statute in discord with federal law. By banning felons
from owning or having any firearms, Missouri may have been overzealous in
its regulation, particularly in light of the federal law. While the federal law is
rather broad, it does boast some exceptions that permit felons to have certain
firearms. For example, under the antique firearms exception, 87 federal law
permits felons to possess certain firearms, including modem-day muzzle
loading rifles. A better approach for the Missouri statute would have been to
incorporate by reference the exceptions permitted under federal law. This
design would eliminate much of the existing confusion about the
inconsistency between the state and federal laws relating to felons possessing
firearms and potentially reduce inadvertent violations of the law.
88
The elimination of the five-year disqualification period also has mixed
consequences. The newly enacted lifetime prohibition against felons
possessing firearms brings Missouri's statute in line with federal law. One
might argue, however, that a one-time felon who has avoided being convicted
of a crime for a certain period of time should have his or her right to possess
firearms restored. These commentators bolster their position by arguing that
felons should have their right to vote restored after a certain period of time
following their conviction because the offenders "have paid their debt to
society."' 9 While the content of the rights at issue are quite different, as the
right of voting does not carry with it the potential hazards associated with the
right to possess a gun, the general premise of restoring a citizen's
constitutionally granted rights upon completion of a "probationary" period is
the same. On the other hand, there is clearly some public discomfort with the
idea of a convicted felon possessing firearms at any time, even five years
after release from prison. Given that statistics collected by the Department
of Justice show that 70.2% of prisoners released after a conviction for
possessing, using, or selling illegal weapons were rearrested within three
years,9 1 a lifetime prohibition is sensible in the interest of public safety.
A more difficult topic is the removal of the "dangerous" felony
limitation by the 2008 revision to Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070. Under
86. Id.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16) (2006).
88. See Andy Boyle, Felons Hunting with Guns Slip Past State Law, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 10, 2008 (reporting that in Arkansas many felons
believed that they were permitted to hunt with muzzleloaders while state law actually
prohibited them from owning any firearm).
89. PETrUS, supra note 79, at 143; see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 80.
90. See, e.g., DiCosmo, supra note 1.
91. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT,
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the new statute, a person convicted of any felony is prohibited from
possessing any firearm. 92 Such a broad prohibition has been criticized as
"wildly overinclusive, encompassing . . . non-violent felonies that offer no
hint of the potentially violent tendencies of convicted individuals." 93 Yet,
prosecutors prefer a blanket approach in order to avoid inadvertently omitting
dangerous crimes in an exhaustive list.
94
There is, however, a middle ground in the debate between prohibiting all
felons from possessing firearms and only prohibiting felons convicted of an
enumerated felony from possessing a firearm. Under the federal statute, for
example, those convicted of felonies related to violation of anti-trust statutes
or other laws related to business practices are not prohibited from possessing
a gun.95 Following this lead, at the state level there are a number of felonies
that do not involve violence or indicate that a person convicted under the law
would be dangerous with a gun. For example, possessing gambling records,
96
tampering with computer data,97 forgery,98 and theft of cable television
service99 are all felonies under Missouri law. It is sensible to exclude citizens
convicted under these laws from a prohibition on felons having firearms.
In order to protect against an overly broad restriction on firearm
possession, a compromise solution would be preferable to an outright ban on
all felons from possessing firearms. While it is justifiable to ban those
convicted of violent crimes from possessing firearms, those convicted of
nonviolent crimes involving merely deceptive behavior should not be
included in the ban, as their crimes do not reflect a propensity towards
violence.
Perhaps a more difficult decision, however, is whether those convicted
of drug-related felonies should be disqualified from owning weapons. Under
the pre-2008 version of the Missouri felon-in-possession statute, drug crimes
were not included in the term "dangerous felonies."' 0 0 One could question
whether a drug-related felony should disqualify a person from possessing a
firearm. However, federal law has recognized that there is a dangerous nexus
between drug crimes and firearms, and has enacted sentence enhancement for
using a firearm in relation to drug trafficking. 10 1 Federal legislators have
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070 (Supp. 2008).
93. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 597, 604 (2006).
94. Letter from H. Morley Swingle to Michael Gibbons and Rod Jetton, supra
note 3.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A) (2006).
96. Mo. REV. STAT. § 572.050 (2000).
97. Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.095 (Supp. 2008).
98. MO. REV. STAT. § 570.090 (Supp. 2008).
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 570.300 (Supp. 2008).
100. Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070 (2000), amended by Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070
(Supp. 2008).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006).
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justified this enhancement on the basis that "firearms are the tools of the trade
of most drug traffickers. Weapons clearly facilitate the criminal transactions
and embolden violent thugs to commit their crimes."'10 2 These findings lend
credible support to the idea that those convicted of drug felonies (at least
those related to trafficking) are prone to violence and should therefore be
barred from possessing firearms under Missouri law.
From a policy standpoint of preferring congruity and simplicity, the
Missouri legislature should have revised the felon-in-possession statute to
mirror the federal statute. Even though the federal approach is slightly over-
inclusive in its blanket prohibition of all felons except those convicted of anti-
trust and business felonies,' °3 it would provide a consistent rule with which
felons could be familiar. As such, felons would be less likely to inadvertently
violate either state or federal law because of confusion about the differences
between the statutes. Instead of bringing Missouri law into harmony with
federal standards, the 2008 revision to Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070
only made minor changes to the state statute and ultimately resulted in a
standard distinct from federal law.'
4
Consistency would avoid some of the nonsensical outcomes that have
arisen out of the overlapping state and federal statutes. For example, because
Missouri law proscribes possession of a firearm by any felon, whether
convicted in state or federal court, 10 5 but the federal law proscribes possession
by any felon except those convicted of anti-trust and business practices
felonies,' °6 a person convicted of a federal anti-trust felony is permitted to
possess a firearm under federal law but not under Missouri law. Similarly, a
person convicted of murder under Missouri law can possess a muzzleloader
within minutes of his or her release from prison under the federal felon-in-
possession statute, but is prohibited from ever owning a firearm under state
law. These examples demonstrate that the current configuration can lead to
results easily comprehended by lawyers as a side effect of a government
system of dual sovereignty, but likely misunderstood 10 7 by laypersons lacking
an understanding of the division of state and federal criminal statutes. This
102. 143 CONG. REC. 764 (1997) (statement of Sen. Helms). The statement
quoted in the text is in relation to a bill to tighten the existing statute after a decision
of the Supreme Court limited the application of the earlier version of the law. Id,
103. The approach is over-inclusive, in that crimes other than anti-trust and
business felonies are also nonviolent in nature and indicate no propensity towards
violence. Logically, those other nonviolent felonies should also be excluded from the
ban. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
104. Some commentators argue that the federalization of crime is undesirable and
that most crimes should be designated and prosecuted at the state level. See Steven D.
Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REv.
643, 645-46 (1997).
105. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.070 (Supp. 2008).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
107. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 88, at 1 (explaining felons' confusion over a
similar felon-in-possession statute in Arkansas).
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confusion would be avoided if Missouri had adopted a felon-in-possession
statute mirroring the provisions of the federal statute.'
08
C. Constitutionality of the Revised State Felon-in-Possession Statute
Under the Missouri Constitution
As noted above, the Missouri Supreme Court has not had occasion to
decide the constitutionality of the pre-2008 felon-in-possession statute. The
court has only given broad guidance as to how the legislature can regulate
gun possession. Some of the changes enacted in the 2008 revision of the
Missouri felon-in-possession law could lead to potential constitutional
challenges of the statute based on the plain text of article I, section 23 and
related case law.
The Missouri Constitution guarantees a right to "every citizen to keep
and bear arms," 109 but appellate court decisions have held that the legislature
has the authority to regulate the "time, place and manner" of possessing
weapons."0 Interestingly, Missouri courts have never broached the question
of whether the state constitution precludes the legislature from regulating who
can possess firearms. This question is especially relevant in the wake of the
2008 revision to the state felon-in-possession statute. The previous statute
prohibited certain felons from possessing certain firearms for a specified
period of time after their conviction."' By setting limits on the time period
during which a felon is prohibited from possessing a firearm, it was arguably
in line with Joyce. The old Missouri statute also restricted the manner in
which an individual could possess a firearm by preventing felons from having
concealable firearms but not those with barrels at least sixteen inches long." 
2
Under the 2008 revision to Missouri Revised Statute § 571.070, the
restrictions on possession of a firearm by a felon extend beyond time, place,
and manner to a new blanket prohibition preventing an entire class of
persons, those convicted of felonies, from ever possessing any firearm. The
language of the Missouri Constitution protecting a right to bear arms is far
108. One might question why a state statute is necessary if the federal law would
already prohibit felons from possessing firearms. The best response is that it provides
state prosecutors the ability to "package" a felon-in-possession offense with other
charges. For example, if a felon were caught with a firearm while perpetrating a state
crime like burglary, the charges could be brought together in state court. Without a
state criminal statute, separate charges would have to be brought by a federal
prosecutor in federal court under the federal statute.
109. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 23.
110. See, e.g., City of Cape Girardeau v. Joyce, 884 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1994).
111. Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070 (2000), amended by Mo. REV. STAT. § 571.070
(Supp. 2008).
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more explicit than the analogous provision in the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution. While the United States Constitution addresses
the general "right of the people" to bear arms prefaced by vague language
about a well-regulated militia,' 13 the Missouri Constitution uses specific
language: "the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms ... shall not be
questioned.""l
4
This specific language in the Missouri Constitution could be interpreted
to impose a stricter standard for firearm possession legislation than is found
in the United States Constitution. While the text of article I, section 23 does
not guarantee a right to possess any type of gun at any time, it specifically
precludes "questioning" the right of every citizen to possess a firearm. As a
result, by enacting a broad prohibition against anyone convicted of a felony
from possessing a firearm, which arguably treads on the right protected by
article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, there is a high probability of
a constitutional challenge to the 2008 revision of the Missouri felon-in-
possession statute.
The Missouri Supreme Court has never determined the scope of the
"every citizen" language in the article I, section 23 of the state constitution.
However, decisions by a number of other state supreme courts illuminate the
issue,"15 and lead to the conclusion that the court would, in fact, uphold the
felon-in-possession statute as a reasonable limitation on the constitutional
right to bear arms. This standard of reasonableness has been applied as a
pragmatic alternative to the federal constitutional analysis that would require
"strict scrutiny" review."l 6 One commentator noted that state supreme courts
are eager to declare felon-in-possession statutes reasonable under a variety of
state constitutional schemes and have never invalidated a felon possession
ban on constitutional grounds.' 1
7
In general, courts defer to legislatures on the issue of firearm
regulations, 1 8 and the Missouri Supreme Court has only briefly referred to
this deferential standard of reasonableness. In 1886, the Missouri Supreme
Court heard the case of State v. Shelby. 19 Here, the defendant was charged
with possessing a firearm while under the influence of alcohol.' 20  The
defendant argued that the statute under which he was charged conflicted with
his state constitutional right to bear arms. 12 1 The court rejected this argument
on the basis that it was a reasonable regulation on the right to bear arms, and
113. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
114. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (emphasis added).
115. See Winkler, supra note 93, at 600.
116. Id. at 604.
117. Id. at 603 & n.36. Missouri is absent from Winkler's list of state supreme
courts to have decided on the issue. Id.
118. Id. at 600.
119. 2 S.W. 468 (Mo. 1886).
120. Id. at 468.
121. Id. at 468-69.
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stated that a "citizen must yield" to such legislation. 122 This standard of
reasonableness has been employed by other states' courts to enable "the
legislature[] to enact policies to preserve and enhance public safety."' 123 Such
policies have been justified as a valid exercise of the state's "police
power."'
124
For these reasons, it is likely that if confronted with a challenge to
Missouri's 2008 revision of its felon-in-possession statute, the Missouri
Supreme Court would hold that the statute is constitutional as a reasonable
regulation on the right to bear arms. Even though there are cogent arguments
that the new statute is in conflict with article I, section 23 of the Missouri
Constitution, they are outweighed by the countervailing considerations noted
above. Given the virtual unanimity of other state courts on the issue, and the
Missouri Supreme Court's previous deference to the legislature on
regulations as to the right to bear arms, it appears that the Missouri Supreme
Court would take a similar course and allow reasonable regulations on
firearms to stand.
D. Constitutionality of the Revised Statute Under the U.S. Constitution
As previously discussed, 1 5 District of Columbia v. Heller did not decide
whether the Second Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as a fundamental due process
protection, thereby imposing limits on state legislation. In anticipation of the
possibility that the Supreme Court will later answer this question
affirmatively, it is important to consider whether Missouri's felon-in-
possession statute would survive a federal constitutional challenge under
Heller.
Heller overturned the District of Columbia's refusal to grant Dick Heller
a permit to keep a handgun in his home because the Court found that the
decision conflicted with the Second Amendment. 126 The majority opinion
attempted to preempt any argument that the opinion should be construed to
weaken laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms.' Much of this
Note's previous discussion regarding the constitutional implications of the
federal felon-in-possession statute is applicable to the state statute as well.
The federal statute is actually narrower than the state statute, as the federal
law allows certain felons to possess firearms and all felons to possess certain
122. Id. at 469.
123. Winkler, supra note 93, at 602.
124. Mitchell D. Ridberg, Comment, The Impact of State Constitutional Right to
Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 187
(1970) ("In the absence of specific constitutional authorization to regulate arms, the
authority for such regulation stems solely from the general police power.").
125. See supra Part II.D.1.
126. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008).
127. See supra Part II.D.1.
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firearms. 28 Conversely, the state statute applies to all persons convicted of
any felony. 129 Accordingly, if the Supreme Court were to invalidate the
federal felon-in-possession statute under the Second Amendment and
incorporate the Second Amendment against the states, it is likely that the
broader state statute would also be susceptible to invalidation.
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of House Bill 2034 in 2008 marked a subtle yet significant
shift in Missouri's felons possessing firearms policy. The state moved from a
narrowly-tailored approach, which left "loopholes" allowing some seemingly
dangerous criminals to possess firearms, to a blanket prohibition preventing
any felon from possessing a firearm at any time. While the modified statute
includes some improvements, a better tactic would have been to match the
federal felon-in-possession statute. This broadened law also makes the
statute more susceptible to challenges under the Missouri Constitution's
provision on the right to bear arms. Although it is uncertain how the
Missouri Supreme Court would view this statute, it is probable that the statute
would be upheld. While challenges to the statute have been rare, the fact that
more prosecutions will likely result from the broadened law could lead to an
increased number of cases moving through the system. As a result, the
Missouri legal community should expect to see increased interest in the
state's felon-in-possession statute in coming years.
ADAM E. HANNA
128. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
129. Mo. REv. STAT. § 571.070 (Supp. 2008).
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